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Secure Communications for UAV-Enabled Mobile
Edge Computing Systems
Yi Zhou, Cunhua Pan, Phee Lep Yeoh, Kezhi Wang, Maged Elkashlan,
Branka Vucetic, Fellow, IEEE, and Yonghui Li, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper, we propose a secure unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) mobile edge computing (MEC) system where
multiple ground users offload large computing tasks to a nearby
legitimate UAV in the presence of multiple eavesdropping UAVs
with imperfect locations. To enhance security, jamming signals
are transmitted from both the full-duplex legitimate UAV and
non-offloading ground users. For this system, we design a
low-complexity iterative algorithm to maximize the minimum
secrecy capacity subject to latency, minimum offloading and
total power constraints. Specifically, we jointly optimize the UAV
location, users’ transmit power, UAV jamming power, offloading
ratio, UAV computing capacity, and offloading user association.
Numerical results show that our proposed algorithm significantly
outperforms baseline strategies over a wide range of UAV self-
interference (SI) efficiencies, locations and packet sizes of ground
users. Furthermore, we show that there exists a fundamental
tradeoff between the security and latency of UAV-enabled MEC
systems which depends on the UAV SI efficiency and total UAV
power constraints.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, mobile edge computing,
UAV communication, secrecy capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
UNMANNED aerial vehicles (UAVs) are promising foron-demand deployment in wireless networks due to their
mobility and flexibility [1], [2]. The strong line-of-sight (LoS)
characteristics of UAV air-to-ground communications have
also attracted significant commercial interest for delivering
high-quality aerial services. Owing to these advantages, much
research effort have been devoted to developing a range of
UAV-enabled wireless platforms, such as aerial base stations
and relays [3]–[5]. In [3], the optimal UAV base station
deployment, antenna beamwidth and bandwidth allocation
were jointly investigated to minimize the sum uplink power
subject to minimal rate constraints. In [4], the optimal UAV
deployment was investigated to maximize the number of
ground users served by a UAV base station subject to quality-
of-service (QoS) constraints. The authors in [5] studied the
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joint blocklength and location optimization for ultra-reliable
and low-latency UAV relay communications.
Given the broadcast nature of wireless transmissions, it
is important to consider the security performance of UAV-
enabled platforms where the communication between ground
users and the UAV can be readily overheard by nearby
eavesdroppers [6]. To tackle this issue, some physical layer
security (PLS) techniques have been considered such as UAV
aerial base station [7], [8], cooperative UAV relays [9] and
UAV friendly jamming [10]–[14]. In [7], the authors proposed
a secrecy capacity maximization algorithm in a UAV-assisted
downlink network. In [8], the security performance of both the
uplink and the downlink communications has been addressed.
In [9], the authors jointly optimized the trajectory and power
allocation of a UAV relay to minimize the outage probability.
In [10], the UAV deployment and jamming power allocation
were jointly optimized to improve the secrecy performance
of a wireless network with unknown eavesdropper locations.
In [11], the secrecy rate of the ground wiretap channel has
been maximized by jointly optimizing the UAV trajectory and
jamming power. In [12] and [13], the minimum average secre-
cy rate was maximized by jointly optimizing the trajectories
and transmit powers of both the UAV base station and UAV
jammer with time division multiple access (TDMA) and fre-
quency division multiple access (FDMA), respectively. In [14],
by considering the location uncertainty of eavesdropper, the
authors proposed an efficient iterative algorithm to maximize
the worst-case secrecy capacity.
Another considerations in wireless systems are the comput-
ing capacity and latency performance of users [15]. To alle-
viate computing capacity constraints and reduce transmission
and computing latencies, mobile edge computing (MEC) has
emerged as a promising platform for providing high-capacity
computing resources at the network edge [16]–[18]. In [16], a
total energy consumption minimization problem was studied
by jointly optimizing the energy transmit beamforming, of-
floading ratio and time allocation subject to the computing la-
tency requirements in a MEC-enabled wireless power transfer
network. In [17], the computing resource allocation between
MEC servers and mobile users was investigated through a
game-theoretic approach. In [18], a low-complexity algorithm
was proposed to minimize the overall energy consumption in
a two-tier computing offloading MEC network.
Due to its flexible and rapid deployment capabilities, UAV
is an ideal MEC platform for performing computing intensive
tasks for the ground users. We envision potential applications
for such UAV-enabled MEC platforms include the need for
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fast deployment in emergency response scenarios, such as
large-scale energy outages in smart energy grids and major
traffic disruptions in intelligent transport systems. Several
papers have considered the performance of UAV-enabled MEC
systems [19]–[21]. In [19], the authors developed an algorithm
to minimize the sum of the maximum latency among all
ground users served by a UAV-enabled MEC base station by
jointly optimizing the UAV trajectory, user association and
user offloading ratio. In [20], the UAV trajectory, bandwidth
allocation and user association are jointly optimized to max-
imize the minimum throughput of all mobile users served by
a MEC-UAV. The authors in [21] jointly optimized the task
offloading decision, bit allocation and UAV trajectory aiming
at minimizing the overall energy consumption in a UAV-aided
edge computing network.
Though providing a general security framework for the
power and trajectory optimization in UAV-assisted network,
these interesting existing studies in [7]–[14] only focused on
the UAV without considering the mobile edge computing.
The offloading performance has not been jointly addressed
in these works. For the UAV-enabled MEC systems, although
several significant concerns such as latency and throughput
have been optimized, the security issue that is one major con-
cern in UAV-enabled MEC system has not been investigated
in [19]–[21]. Motivated by this background, in this paper, we
present a novel framework aiming at maximizing the security
performance of a UAV-enabled MEC system where one full-
duplex legitimate UAV with computing resource is capable of
receiving and processing the offloaded packets from multiple
ground users and transmitting the jamming signal to interfere
with multiple eavesdropping UAVs with imperfect locations.
Specifically, we consider that a number of ground users offload
large computing tasks to the legitimate UAV due to strict
latency requirements. To further enhance the security, non-
offloading users also transmit jamming signals to interfere
with the eavesdropping UAVs. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first paper to jointly consider the security, latency
and offloading performance in UAV-enabled MEC systems.
Moreover, to satisfy the latency requirement, the users with
large tasks to be executed have to associate with the legitimate
UAV due to the limited computing resource equipped on them,
while such offloading transmission might be overheard by the
eavesdropping UAVs, which results in a degraded security
performance. We highlight the fundamental tradeoff between
the security and latency of UAV-enabled MEC system which
has not been previously analyzed in existing works.
A key challenge in this paper is to efficiently maximize the
minimum secrecy capacity by jointly optimizing the UAV lo-
cation, users’ transmit power, UAV jamming power, offloading
ratio, UAV computing capacity, and offloading user associa-
tion subject to MEC constraints of latency, total power and
minimum offloading requirements. Such a joint optimization
problem is valuable and meaningful due to the importance of
providing secure communications in future wireless systems.
First, by optimizing the UAV location, we can not only reduce
the transmission latency for the offloading users significantly,
but also enhance the secrecy capacity for each offloading link.
We further consider the impact of the UAV jamming power
and users’ transmit power on the secrecy capacity. Lastly, we
optimize the offloading ratio, UAV computing capacity, and
offloading user association to satisfy the latency requirement,
which also indirectly impact on the secrecy capacity. Due to
the coupling effects between the UAV location, users’ transmit
power, UAV jamming power, offloading ratio, UAV computing
capacity, and offloading user association, this optimization
problem is non-convex and very challenging to solve.
To overcome this challenge, we apply a number of efficient
mathematical techniques including block coordinate descent
(BCD) method, successive convex approximation (SCA), alter-
nating approximation, and branch-and-cut method to obtain a
high-quality solution for our joint optimization problem. First,
we adopt a bounded eavesdropper location error model to dis-
cuss the location uncertainty of the eavesdropping UAVs and
derive a mathematically tractable expression of lower bound
secrecy capacity. To convexify the approximated objective
function, slack variables are introduced. Next, we decompose
the original optimization problem into five subproblems by
employing the BCD method and propose a low-complexity
iterative algorithm to solve each subproblem. We solve the
first three subproblems of UAV location, users’ transmit power
and UAV jamming power by applying an SCA technique
on the secrecy capacity. Then, we formulate the offloading
ratio and UAV computing capacity as convex functions that
can be jointly optimized in a single subproblem. Finally,
we apply a branch-and-cut method to solve the offloading
user association as a binary linear problem. Numerical results
show that our proposed algorithm significantly outperforms
baseline strategies over a wide range of UAV self-interference
(SI) efficiencies, locations and packet sizes of ground users.
Furthermore, we show that there exists a fundamental tradeoff
between the security and latency of UAV-enabled MEC sys-
tems which depends on the UAV SI efficiency and total UAV
power constraints.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the secure UAV-enabled MEC system model
and formulates the joint optimization problem. In Section III,
we propose an efficient iterative algorithm to maximize the
minimum secrecy capacity by means of a number of convex
optimization techniques. The effectiveness of our proposed
solution is shown through simulation results in Section VI.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Fig. 1 depicts our proposed UAV-enabled MEC system with
N ground users, one legitimate UAV and E non-colluding
eavesdropping UAVs, where the sets of ground users and
eavesdropping UAVs are defined as N and E , respectively. It is
assumed that the legitimate UAV knows the perfect locations
of ground users and the imperfect locations of eavesdropping
UAVs [14]. We consider that each user has a set of tasks
to process. Due to limited local computing capability and
latency requirements, the users can either process their tasks
locally or offload some of their tasks to the legitimate UAV.
In the presence of eavesdropping UAVs, the legitimate UAV
operating in full-duplex mode is equipped with two antennas
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Offloading signal
Eavesdropping UAV
Non-offloading User
Legitimate UAVEavesdropping
Jamming signal
Local computing
Self interference Offloading User
Interference signal
Fig. 1. System model for full-duplex UAV-enabled mobile edge computing
systems.
where one receive antenna is used for receiving the offloading
signals from the offloading users and one transmit antenna is
used for transmitting the jamming signal to the eavesdropping
UAVs. The ground users and the eavesdropping UAVs are
equipped with a single antenna for transmission and eaves-
dropping, respectively. To further enhance the security, the
non-offloading users can transmit jamming signals to interfere
with the eavesdropping UAVs. We consider a multiple access
channel where all ground users can transmit their signals
simultaneously using the same channel [17] [22]. At the
legitimate UAV and eavesdropping UAVs, the desired user’s
signal is decoded by regarding all other users’ signals as co-
channel interference. The descriptions of some notations used
in this paper are summarized in Table I.
A. Communication Model
The coordinate of the i-th user is denoted as wi =
(xi, yi)
T ∈ R2×1,∀i ∈ N . The legitimate UAV is fixed
at altitude Hu above ground and the horizontal location of
UAV is denoted by y = (xu, yu)T ∈ R2×1. For air-to-ground
channel, since the propagation conditions between the UAV
and ground users can be approximated as free space when the
UAV is placed above a certain altitude and the LoS probability
is close to one, we adopt a simple channel model where the
channel gains are dominated by the LoS links [1]. Then, the
channel power gain between the i-th user and the legitimate
UAV can be written as
hiu =
β1
H2u + ||y− wi||2 , ∀i ∈ N , (1)
where β1 = gtgr
(
λ
4pid0
)2
denotes the channel power gain of
ground-to-air link at the reference distance d0 = 1 m, with
gt and gr being the antenna power gains of the ground users
and UAVs, respectively, and λ is the wavelength. We note that
more antennas at both the ground users and UAVs can increase
the antenna array gains [22], i.e., gt and gr.
Define ai = {0, 1}, i ∈ N as the offloading user association
variable where ai = 1 means that the i-th user is associated
with the legitimate UAV and part of its task will be offloaded to
the UAV, while ai = 0 represents that this user will execute the
whole computing task locally. If the i-th user is associated with
the legitimate UAV, the data rate of the uplink transmission is
given as
riu = log2
1 + pihiu∑
k∈N ,k 6=i
pkhku + γpjam + σ2
 ,∀i ∈ Nas,
(2)
where pi is the transmit power at the i-th user, Nas = {i|ai =
1,∀i ∈ N} is the set of associated users, ∑
k∈N ,k 6=i
pkhku is
the interference from all other users except i and σ2 is the
noise power. Moreover, pjam denotes the transmit power of the
jamming signal from the legitimate UAV to the eavesdropping
UAVs which results in a residual self-interference (SI) power
of γpjam where γ is the SI efficiency of the full-duplex
transmitter [23].
We assume that the e-th eavesdropping UAV is located
at a fixed altitude of He with horizontal coordinates ve =
(xe, ye)
T ∈ R2×1,∀e ∈ E which are imperfectly known at
the legitimate UAV. Similar to [12], we consider a bounded
eavesdropper location error model given by ve ∈ Θe ,
{||v˜e−ve|| ≤ χ} where v˜e is the estimated horizontal location
and χ is the maximum estimation error. The channel power
gain between the i-th user and the e-th eavesdropping UAV
can be given as
hie =
β1
H2e + ||wi − ve||2 , ∀i ∈ N , ∀e ∈ E . (3)
We note that the channel power gains between different
UAVs are mainly dominated by the LoS links [24]. Hence,
the channel power gain between the e-th eavesdropping UAV
and the legitimate UAV is given by
heu =
β2
(Hu −He)2 + ||y− ve||2 , ∀e ∈ E , (4)
where β2 denotes the channel power gain of the air-to-air link
at a reference distance d0 = 1 m and can be written as β2 =
grgr
(
λ
4pid0
)2
.
The data rate for the e-th eavesdropping UAV to eavesdrop
the signal from the i-th associated user can be given as
rie = log2
1 + pihie∑
k∈N ,k 6=i
pkhke + pjamheu + σ2
 ,
∀i ∈ Nas, ∀e ∈ E .
(5)
The secrecy capacity is given by [25]–[27]
Ci =
[
riu −max
e∈E
(rie)
]+
, ∀i ∈ Nas, (6)
where [x]+ , max(x, 0). Note that if users are not associated
with the legitimate UAV and execute the whole task locally,
there is no security issue involved.
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TABLE I
TABLE OF NOTATIONS
Notation Description
N , Nas, E The set of ground users, associated ground users and eavesdropping UAVs
ai The user association variable
pi The transmit power at the i-th user
pjam The jamming power at the legitimate UAV
γ The self-interference efficiency
σ2 The noise power
β1, β2 The reference channel power gain of ground-to-air link and air-to-air link
y, wi, ve The horizontal location of the legitimate UAV, the i-th ground user, the e-th
eavesdropping UAV
v˜e The estimated horizontal location of the e-th eavesdropping UAV
χ The maximum estimation error
Hu, He The altitude of the legitimate UAV and the e-th eavesdropping UAV
riu The uplink data rate from the i-th user
rie The rate for eavesdropping the i-th offloading signal at the e-th eavesdropping
UAV
Ci The secrecy capacity at the i-th user
Di The task data size of the i-th user
Fi The CPU cycles for computing task Di
T The latency constraint
ηi The offloading ratio of the i-th user
f0, fiu The local computing capacity and the computing capacity of the legitimate
UAV assigned to the i-th user
B. Computing Model
We assume that each user has a task Ui to be executed
which is characterized as [28]
Ui = (Di, Fi, T ), ∀i ∈ N , (7)
where Di denotes the data size of this task and Fi describes
the number of CPU cycles for computing one bit of task Di.
Moreover, T is the latency requirement for this task. Without
loss of generality, we assume that all the tasks have the same
time requirement T .
Note that since there is a delay-sensitive task to be executed
at each user, the users with large packet size to be processed
are not able to locally compute the whole task due to the
latency limitation. We consider the case that each task can be
divided into two parts. One part is offloaded to the associated
UAV and the other part is self-executed. Define ηi ∈ [0, 1] as
the offloading ratio where Diηi is processed by the UAV and
the rest Di(1− ηi) will be computed locally.
1) Local Computing: For local computing, Di(1− ηi) bits
will be self-executed at the i-th user. The computing time for
local computing TLi can be expressed as [18]
TLi =
Di(1− ηi)Fi
f0
, ∀i ∈ N , (8)
where f0 is the computing capacity at each user. The power
consumption for self-execution is given by
PLi = κi(f0)
3, (9)
where κi ≥ 0 is the effective switched capacitance.
2) Offloading to UAV: For task offloading, Diηi bits will be
offloaded to the associated UAV. Then, the transmission time
for offloading for the i-th associated user is given by [18]
TTri =
Diηi
Briu
, ∀i ∈ Nas, (10)
where B is the bandwidth. Denote fiu as the computing
capacity of the UAV assigned to the i-th associated user, the
computing time for processing each offloading task at the UAV
is expressed as
TOi =
FiDiηi
fiu
, i ∈ Nas. (11)
Note that for non-offloading user, i.e., i ∈ N/Nas, TTri =
TOi = 0 since it executes the whole task locally and ηi =
0. Moreover, the CPU power consumption at the UAV for
executing the task for the i-th associated user is expressed
as [19]
POi = f
3
iu, ∀i ∈ Nas, (12)
where  denotes the power consumption coefficient depending
on the chip architecture of the UAV.
C. Offloading, Latency and Power Constraints
The total computing resource allocated to the associated
users should be bounded by the maximum UAV computing
capacity fUAVmax such that
N∑
i=1
aifiu ≤ fUAVmax . (13)
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In order to utilize the UAV computing resource more effec-
tively and efficiently, we also impose a minimum offloading
requirement Dmin at the UAV such that
N∑
i=1
aiDiηi ≥ Dmin. (14)
Note that each task can be self-executed and processed at
the UAV simultaneously. To satisfy the latency requirement,
the completion time of this task at the i-th user should be
constrained by
max{TLi , (TTri + TOi )} ≤ T,∀i ∈ N . (15)
Specifically, if the i-th user cannot compute the whole task
locally under the latency limitation, i.e., DiFif0 ≥ T . Then, it
must offload some part of this task to the UAV to reduce the
execution time, this intrinsic constraint can be given as
(1− ai)DiFi
f0
≤ T,∀i ∈ N . (16)
According to (16), if the i-th user is able to execute the
whole task locally within the latency requirement, it can be
associated with the UAV or not. Otherwise, the user must be
associated with the UAV and ai must be equal to one to release
the constraint.
From the power consumption perspective, for each user, the
power is divided into two parts. One part is used for locally
computing the task and the other part is used for transmitting.
Then the total power consumption constraint at each user can
be formulated as
PLi + pi ≤ Puemax, ∀i ∈ N . (17)
Moreover, the UAV power consumption which consists of
jamming power and CPU processing power should be bounded
by a maximal budget PUAVmax , which is given by
pjam +
N∑
i=1
aiP
O
i ≤ PUAVmax . (18)
D. Problem Formulation
In this paper, we seek to optimize six key variables im-
pacting on the security, latency, and offloading performance,
namely the UAV location y = (xu, yu)T , users’ transmit
power Pue , {pi,∀i ∈ N}, UAV jamming power pjam,
offloading ratio η , {ηi,∀i ∈ N}, UAV computing ca-
pacity F , {fiu,∀i ∈ N} and offloading user association
A , {ai,∀i ∈ N}. The objective is to maximize the minimum
secrecy capacity among all offloading ground users while
guaranteeing the latency, total power and minimum offloading
requirements. The optimization problem can be formulated as
max
y,Pue,pjam,η,F,A
min
i∈Nas
Ci (19a)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
aifiu ≤ fUAVmax (19b)
N∑
i=1
aiDiηi ≥ Dmin (19c)
TLi ≤ T,∀i ∈ N (19d)
TTri + T
O
i ≤ T,∀i ∈ Nas (19e)
(1− ai)DiFi
f0
≤ T,∀i ∈ N (19f)
PLi + pi ≤ Puemax, ∀i ∈ N (19g)
pjam +
N∑
i=1
aiP
O
i ≤ PUAVmax (19h)
ai = {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ N (19i)
ηi ∈ [0, 1]. (19j)
We note that the location uncertainty of the eavesdrop-
ping UAVs makes it challenging to obtain a mathematically
tractable expression of the objective function in (19). To do
so, we consider the eavesdropper location that results in the
worst-case lower bound on the secrecy capacity of the i-th
offloading user, which is given by
Ci =
riu −max
e∈E
log2
1 + pihie∑
k∈N ,k 6=i
pkhke + pjamheu + σ2



+
≥

riu −max
e∈E

log2
1 + pihmaxie∑
k∈N ,k 6=i
pkhminke + pjamh
min
eu + σ2

︸ ︷︷ ︸
rubie


+
= Clbi ,
(20)
where we consider the UAV location within the uncertainty
bound corresponding to the upper bound of eavesdropping
rate rubie between the i-th user and the e-th eavesdropping
UAV. This eavesdropping UAV horizontal location ve cor-
responds to the location satisfying hmaxie = maxve∈Θe
hie =
β1
H2e+(||wi−v˜e||−χ)2 when ve = v˜e +
wi−v˜e
||wi−v˜e||χ, h
min
ke =
min
ve∈Θe
hke =
β1
H2e+(||wk−v˜e||+χ)2 when ve = v˜e −
wk−v˜e
||wk−v˜e||χ,
and hmineu = minve∈Θe
heu =
β2
(Hu−He)2+(||y−v˜e||+χ)2 when
ve = v˜e − y−v˜e||y−v˜e||χ.
Therefore, to make (19) more tractable, we have trans-
formed the objective function to maximize the minimum lower
bound secrecy capacity min
i∈Nas
Clbi . Since the joint optimization
always results in a non-negative secrecy capacity according
to [8] and [14], the [·]+ operator on the objective function
can be omitted without affecting the solution. Moreover, we
note that even with an explicit expression, the approximated
objective function max min
i∈Nas
Clbi is non-convex due to the
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max(·) and min(·) operations. To convexify the objective
function, we further introduce two auxiliary variables C0 and
r0 [12], which yields the following problem
max
y,Pue,pjam,η,F,A,C0,r0
C0 (21a)
s.t. riu − r0 ≥ C0,∀i ∈ Nas (21b)
rubie ≤ r0,∀i ∈ Nas, ∀e ∈ E (21c)
(19b)− (19j),
where r0 represents the highest rubie among all eavesdropping
UAVs and C0 corresponds to the minimum Clbi among all
offloading users. Although relaxed, problem (21) is still a non-
convex optimization problem due to the binary variable A
and non-convex constraints related to the legitimate UAV and
upper bound eavesdropper rates in (21b), (21c) and (19e).
III. PROPOSED SECURITY MAXIMIZATION ALGORITHM
FOR UAV-ENABLED MEC SYSTEMS
In this section, we detail our proposed security maximiza-
tion algorithm for UAV-enabled MEC systems. To solve the
optimization in (21), we apply the BCD method [1] and
decouple the original problem into five subproblems. We solve
the first three subproblems of optimizing UAV location, users’
transmit power and UAV jamming power by applying an
SCA technique [1] based on the first-order Taylor expansion
of the secrecy capacity. Next, the offloading ratio and UAV
computing capacity are jointly optimized in a single convex
subproblem based on maximizing the total offloaded packets.
Finally, we apply a branch-and-cut method to solve the binary
linear offloading user association problem.
A. UAV Location Subproblem
For any given Pue, pjam, η,F and A, the UAV location
of problem (21) can be optimized by solving the following
problem
max
y,C0,r0
C0 (22a)
s.t. log2

∑
i∈N
β1pi
H2u+||y−wi||2
+ ρ∑
k∈N ,k 6=i
β1pk
H2u+||y−wk||2
+ ρ

︸ ︷︷ ︸
riu
−r0 ≥ C0, ∀i ∈ Nas
(22b)
log2
 β2pjam(Hu−He)2+(||y−v˜e||+χ)2 + ζi,e
β2pjam
(Hu−He)2+(||y−v˜e||+χ)2 + i,e

︸ ︷︷ ︸
rubie
≤ r0, ∀i ∈ Nas, ∀e ∈ E
(22c)
log2

∑
i∈N
β1pi
H2u+||y−wi||2
+ ρ∑
k∈N ,k 6=i
β1pk
H2u+||y−wk||2
+ ρ

︸ ︷︷ ︸
riu
≥ ιi, ∀i ∈ Nas, (22d)
where the constraints (22b), (22c), and (22d) correspond
to (21b), (21c) and (19e), respectively, and all other con-
straints in (21) are not applicable. In (22), we define ρ =
γpjam + σ
2, ζi,e = pihmaxie +
∑
k∈N ,k 6=i
pkh
min
ke + σ
2, i,e =∑
k∈N ,k 6=i
pkh
min
ke + σ
2 and ιi = DiηiB(T−TOi )
. Note that (22) is a
non-convex optimization problem due to the non-convexity of
the logarithm terms in riu and rubie .
In the following, we adopt the SCA technique [1] to re-
express riu as
riu = I1 − log2
 ∑
k∈N ,k 6=i
β1pk
H2u + ||y− wk||2 + ρ

︸ ︷︷ ︸
I2
,
(23)
where I1 is a concave lower bound expression based on the
first-order Taylor expansion at the UAV location in the m-th
iteration, y[m], given by
I1 = log2
(∑
i∈N
β1pi
H2u + ||y[m]− wi||2 + ρ
)
−
∑
i∈N
β1pi
(H2u+||y[m]−wi||2)2
(||y− wi||2 − ||y[m]− wi||2)( ∑
i∈N
β1pi
H2u+||y[m]−wi||2
+ ρ
)
ln 2
.
(24)
To convexify I2, we define an auxiliary variable sk ≤ ||y−
wk||2 and apply a Taylor expansion at y[m] which results in
I2 = log2
 ∑
k∈N ,k 6=i
β1pk
H2u + sk
+ ρ
 , (25)
where
sk ≤ ||y[m]− wk||2 + 2(y[m]− wk)T (y− y[m]),∀k ∈ N , k 6= i.
(26)
Based on (24) and (25), the legitimate UAV rate riu is now
concave and the corresponding constraints (22b) and (22d) are
convex.
Applying the SCA approach to (22c), rubie can be rewritten
as
rubie = log2
(
β2pjam
(Hu −He)2 + te + ζi,e
)
− I3, (27)
where
I3 = log2
(
β2pjam
(Hu −He)2 + (||y[m]− v˜e||+ χ)2 + i,e
)
− ϑe((||y− v˜e||+ χ)
2 − (||y[m]− v˜e||+ χ)2)(
β2pjam
(Hu−He)2+(||y[m]−v˜e||+χ)2 + i,e
)
ln 2
,
(28)
with ϑe =
β2pjam
((Hu−He)2+(||y[m]−v˜e||+χ)2)2 and
te ≤(||y[m]− v˜e||+ χ)2
+ 2(||y[m]− v˜e||+ χ) (y[m]− v˜e)
T
||y[m]− v˜e|| (y− y[m]),∀e ∈ E .
(29)
Finally, the UAV location subproblem can be solved as
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max
y,C0,r0,S,T
C0 (30a)
s.t. I1 − I2 − r0 ≥ C0, ∀i ∈ Nas (30b)
log2
(
β2pjam
(Hu −He)2 + te + ζi,e
)
− I3 ≤ r0, ∀i ∈ Nas, ∀e ∈ E
(30c)
I1 − I2 ≥ ιi, ∀i ∈ Nas (30d)
(26), (29),
where S , {sk,∀k ∈ N , k 6= i} and T , {te,∀e ∈ E}.
Due to the convexity of (30), it can be efficiently solved by
utilizing convex optimization software [29].
B. Users’ Transmit Power Subproblem
For any given y, pjam, η,F andA, the users’ transmit power
of problem (21) can be optimized by solving the following
problem
max
Pue,C0,r0
C0 (31a)
s.t. riu − r0 ≥ C0,∀i ∈ Nas (31b)
rubie ≤ r0, ∀i ∈ Nas, ∀e ∈ E (31c)
riu ≥ ιi, ∀i ∈ Nas (31d)
pi ≤ Puemax − PLi , ∀i ∈ N , (31e)
where the constraints (31b), (31c), (31d), and (31e) correspond
to (21b), (21c), (19e) and (19g), respectively, and all other
constraints in (21) are not applicable. Note that problem (31)
is a non-convex optimization problem due to the non-convexity
of riu and rubie . In the following, we adopt the SCA technique
to solve this problem.
To this end, riu can be rewritten as
riu = log2
(∑
i∈N
pihiu + ρ
)
− log2
 ∑
k∈N ,k 6=i
pkhku + ρ

︸ ︷︷ ︸
I4
.
(32)
We apply the similar approach as mentioned in Subsec-
tion III-A and successively approximate I4 into convex term
with respect to the users’ transmit power in the m-th iteration,
pk[m], which is reexpressed as
I4 = log2
 ∑
k∈N ,k 6=i
pk[m]hku + ρ

+
∑
k∈N ,k 6=i
hku(pk − pk[m])( ∑
k∈N ,k 6=i
pk[m]hku + ρ
)
ln 2
.
(33)
To convexify (31c), we apply similar approach to rubie and
reformulate it as
rubie = I5 − log2
 ∑
k∈N ,k 6=i
pkh
min
ke + ωe
 , (34)
where ωe = pjamhmineu + σ
2 and I5 is a convex upper bound
expression based on the first-order Taylor expansion in terms
of the users’ transmit power in the m-th iteration, which is
given by
I5 = log2
pi[m]hmaxie + ∑
k∈N ,k 6=i
pk[m]h
min
ke + ωe

+
hmaxie (pi − pi[m]) +
∑
k∈N ,k 6=i
hminke (pk − pk[m])(
pi[m]hmaxie +
∑
k∈N ,k 6=i
pk[m]hminke + ωe
)
ln 2
.
(35)
Based on (33) and (35), the users’ transmit power subprob-
lem can be efficiently solved using general convex optimiza-
tion solvers by re-expressing the constraints in (31) as
max
Pue,C0,r0
C0 (36a)
s.t. log2
(∑
i∈N
pihiu + ρ
)
− I4 − r0 ≥ C0, ∀i ∈ Nas (36b)
I5 − log2
 ∑
k∈N ,k 6=i
pkh
min
ke + ωe
 ≤ r0, ∀i ∈ Nas, ∀e ∈ E
(36c)
log2
(∑
i∈N
pihiu + ρ
)
− I4 ≥ ιi, ∀i ∈ Nas (36d)
(31e).
C. UAV Jamming Power Subproblem
For any given y,Pue, η,F and A, the UAV jamming power
of problem (21) can be optimized by solving
max
pjam,C0,r0
C0 (37a)
s.t. riu − r0 ≥ C0, ∀i ∈ Nas (37b)
rubie ≤ r0, ∀i ∈ Nas,∀e ∈ E (37c)
riu ≥ ιi,∀i ∈ Nas (37d)
pjam ≤ (PUAVmax −
N∑
i=1
aiP
O
i ), (37e)
where the constraints (37b), (37c), (37d), and (37e) correspond
to (21b), (21c), (19e) and (19h), respectively, and all other
constraints in (21) are not applicable. Note that problem (37) is
non-convex and the non-convexity arises from (37b) and (37d).
Specifically, the first term of (37b), i.e., riu, can be written as
the difference of two concave functions in terms of pjam as
riu = log2
(∑
i∈N
pihiu + γpjam + σ
2
)
− I6, (38)
where I6 is a convex upper bound expression based on the
first-order Taylor expansion in terms of the UAV jamming
power in the m-th iteration, pjam[m], given by
I6 = log2
 ∑
k∈N ,k 6=i
pkhku + γpjam[m] + σ
2

+
γ(pjam − pjam[m])
(
∑
k∈N ,k 6=i
pkhku + γpjam[m] + σ2) ln 2
.
(39)
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According to (39), the UAV jamming power subproblem
can be solved as
max
pjam,C0,r0
C0 (40a)
s.t. log2
(∑
i∈N
pihiu + γpjam + σ
2
)
− I6 − r0 ≥ C0, ∀i ∈ Nas
(40b)
log2
(∑
i∈N
pihiu + γpjam + σ
2
)
− I6 ≥ ιi, ∀i ∈ Nas (40c)
(37c), (37e).
We note that (40) is a convex optimization problem and can
be efficiently solved by convex optimization software.
D. Offloading Ratio and UAV Computing Capacity Subprob-
lems
According to (2), (5) and (21), we note that the offloading
ratio and UAV computing capacity variables do not directly
appear in the secrecy objective function. However, to satisfy
the latency and offloading constraints, we observe that the total
offloaded packets from the users to the UAV is determined
by the offloading ratio, the selection of user offloading ratio
will directly impact the user association solution, which affects
the max-min secrecy capacity. Therefore, we proceed to max-
imize the total offloaded packets by optimizing the offloading
ratio while satisfying the latency requirements for any given
y,Pue, pjam,F and A, which is given by
max
η
∑
i∈Nas
Diηi (41a)
s.t. (19d), (19e), (19j).
We note that maximizing the total offloaded packets is
equivalent to maximizing ηi, i ∈ Nas for any given user
association. Therefore, the optimal offloading ratio can be
derived in closed-form by setting the constraint (19e) with
equality, which is given by
ηi = min
(
TriufiuB
Difiu + FiDiBriu
, 1
)
, ∀i ∈ Nas. (42)
Note that problem (41) is feasible if and only if
ηi ≥ max
(
1− Tf0
DiFi
, 0
)
, ∀i ∈ Nas. (43)
Moreover, the relation between the UAV computing capacity
and user offloading ratio can be seen from (11) where for
a given latency requirement, the UAV computing capacity is
proportional to the user offloading ratio. Therefore, in order
to maximize the minimum computing capacity that the UAV
allocates to each associated user, the UAV computing capacity
problem of (21) for any given y,Pue, pjam, η and A can be
optimized by solving the following problem
max
F,fmin
fmin (44a)
s.t. fmin ≤ fiu, ∀i ∈ Nas (44b)
(19b), (19e), (19h),
where fmin is the minimum computing capacity that UAV
allocates to associated users. Problem (44) is a convex opti-
mization problem since all constraints are convex, therefore,
it can be solved with general convex optimizer.
E. User Association Subproblem
For any given y,Pue, pjam, η and F , the user association
variables can be optimized by solving the following problem
max
A,C0
C0 (45a)
s.t. aiξi + (1− ai)M ≥ C0, ∀i ∈ N (45b)
(19b), (19c), (19e), (19f), (19h), (19i),
where ξi = riu−max
e∈E
rubie and M is a sufficiently large number
which is greater than the upper bound of C0 to ensure that the
objective function C0 is non-zero when ai = 0. Due to the
binary variable ai, problem (45) is non-convex. However, due
to the linear constraints, the user association subproblem is
a binary integer linear problem with linear constraints which
can be solved by using the branch-and-cut method.
F. Proposed Iterative Algorithm
Algorithm 1 Proposed Iterative Optimization for Prob-
lem (19).
1: initialize m = 0, y[m],Pue[m], pjam[m], η[m],F [m] and
A[m].
2: repeat
3: Given {Pue[m], pjam[m], η[m],F [m],A[m]}, find the
optimal UAV location y[m+ 1] according to (30);
4: Given {y[m + 1], pjam[m], η[m],F [m],A[m]}, find
the optimal users’ transmit power Pue[m + 1] according
to (36);
5: Given {y[m+1],Pue[m+1], η[m],F [m],A[m], }, find
the optimal UAV jamming power pjam[m+ 1] according
to (40);
6: Given {y[m + 1],Pue[m + 1], pjam[m +
1],F [m],A[m]}, find the optimal offloading ratio
η[m+ 1] according to (42);
7: Given {y[m + 1],Pue[m + 1], pjam[m + 1], η[m +
1],A[m]}, find the optimal UAV computing capacity
F [m+ 1] according to (44);
8: Given {y[m + 1],Pue[m + 1], pjam[m + 1], η[m +
1],F [m+ 1]}, find the optimal user association A[m+ 1]
according to (45);
9: Update m = m+ 1;
10: until convergence.
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Based on the aforementioned analysis, we describe our
proposed iterative algorithm in Algorithm 1 where the UAV
location y, the users’ transmit power Pue, the UAV jamming
power pjam, the offloading ratios η, the UAV computing
capacity F and user association A are successively optimized
by solving problems (30), (36), (40), (42), (44) and (45)
respectively, while keeping the other variables fixed. Moreover,
the derived solution in each iteration will be applied as the
input for the next iteration. We note that similar convergence
analysis from step 3 to step 5 of Algorithm 1 for UAV location,
users’ transmit power and UAV jamming power subproblems
which are solved by SCA technique has been proved in [1] and
thus it is omitted here for brevity. According to [1], we have
C0(y[m],Pue[m], pjam[m], η[m],F [m],A[m]) ≤ C0(y[m +
1],Pue[m+ 1], pjam[m+ 1], η[m],F [m],A[m]).
Moreover, in step 6 and 7 of Algorithm 1, since η[m + 1]
and F [m + 1] are not in the objective function and the
objective value will keep the same in these subproblem-
s, which results in C0(y[m + 1],Pue[m + 1], pjam[m +
1], η[m],F [m],A[m]) = C0(y[m+ 1],Pue[m+ 1], pjam[m+
1], η[m + 1],F [m],A[m]) = C0(y[m + 1],Pue[m +
1], pjam[m+ 1], η[m+ 1],F [m+ 1],A[m]).
Finally, in step 8 of Algorithm 1, since A[m + 1] is
the globally optimal solution for (45) with fixed y[m +
1],Pue[m + 1], pjam[m + 1], η[m + 1] and F [m + 1], we
have C0(y[m+ 1],Pue[m+ 1], pjam[m+ 1], η[m+ 1],F [m+
1],A[m]) ≤ C0(y[m + 1],Pue[m + 1], pjam[m + 1], η[m +
1],F [m+ 1],A[m+ 1]).
According to the above analysis, we can conclude that
C0(y[m],Pue[m], pjam[m], η[m],F [m],A[m]) ≤ C0(y[m +
1],Pue[m+ 1], pjam[m+ 1], η[m+ 1],F [m+ 1],A[m+ 1]),
which shows that the algorithm yields a non-decreasing se-
quence of the objective value. In addition, the objective value
has upper bound. Hence, the proposed algorithm is guaranteed
to converge.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to validate our
analysis and demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed
algorithm. We consider N = 8 users and E = 2 eavesdropping
UAVs that are randomly and uniformly distributed within a
400 m × 400 m square area. The legitimate UAV has a
fixed altitude of Hu = 120 m [5] and the eavesdropping
UAVs are operated at the altitudes of 110 m and 130 m,
respectively. The maximum estimation error is set as χ = 10
m [14] and the noise power is σ2 = −110 dBm. The
channel power gains for air-to-ground channel and air-to-air
channel are set as β1 = 10−5 and β2 = 10−4, respectively.
We set the power consumption coefficients at the user and
UAV as κi =  = 10−27 [19] and the UAV SI efficiency
as γ = 10−11 [23]. We consider the required number of
CPU cycles per bit is Fi = 1000 cycles/bit. The computing
capacity of the legitimate UAV and ground users are set as
fUAVmax = 2000 MHz and f0 = 200 MHz, respectively. The
power budgets at the legitimate UAV and ground users are
PUAVmax = 1 W and P
ue
max = 0.1 W, respectively. The trans-
mission bandwidth is set as B = 1 MHz. We consider data
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Fig. 2. Max-min secrecy capacity versus number of iterations with different
minimum offloading requirements.
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Fig. 3. CDF of max-min secrecy capacity for random locations of ground
users when T = 0.2 s and Dmin = 60 KB.
offloading with large task size Di which follows a uniform
distribution Di ∼ U [20, 50] KB with a latency requirement of
T = 0.2 s [16].
Fig. 2 shows the convergence of Algorithm 1 with different
minimum offloading requirements Dmin. The plot shows that
our proposed algorithm quickly converges within 12 iterations.
Furthermore, we find that the max-min secrecy capacity in-
creases as Dmin decreases. This is because to maximize the
minimum secrecy capacity according to (45), users with the
highest secrecy capacity will be selected to offload packets
to the legitimate UAV to satisfy the minimum offloading
requirement. Therefore, with a smaller Dmin, fewer users will
be selected to associate with the legitimate UAV and a larger
max-min secrecy capacity is achieved.
In Fig. 3, we highlight the impact of locations of ground
users on the max-min secrecy capacity and plot the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of the max-min secrecy capacity
for random locations of the ground users. We compare our
proposed joint optimization solution in Algorithm 1 with the
following four benchmark schemes: 1) Fixed UAV location:
We set the UAV location to be at the centroid of all users and
all other variables are optimized using Algorithm 1; 2) Fixed
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Fig. 4. CDF of max-min secrecy capacity for random packet sizes of ground
users when T = 0.2 s and Dmin = 60 KB.
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Fig. 5. Max-min secrecy capacity as a function of SI efficiency γ when
T = 0.2 s and Dmin = 60 KB.
users’ transmit power: We set pi = 0.01 W,∀i ∈ N and all
other variables are optimized using Algorithm 1; 3) No UAV
jamming: We set pjam = 0 W and all other variables are
optimized using Algorithm 1; 4) Fixed offloading variables:
We set ηi = 0.5, fiu = fUAVmax /N,∀i ∈ Nas and all other
variables are optimized using Algorithm 1. Fig. 3 shows that
our proposed joint optimization solution outperforms all other
baseline solutions over a wide range of random locations
of ground users. Our proposed joint optimization solution
achieves a max-min secrecy capacity median of 0.9 bps/Hz,
which significantly outperforms the “Fixed UAV location”,
“Fixed users’ transmit power”, “No UAV jamming”, and
“Fixed offloading variables” strategies by at least 243%.
Fig. 4 depicts the CDF of the max-min secrecy capacity
for random packet sizes of the ground users. It can be seen
that our proposed joint optimization solution outperforms
all other baseline solutions over a wide range of random
packet sizes of ground users. We note that our proposed joint
optimization solution achieves a max-min secrecy capacity
median of 0.51 bps/Hz, which significantly outperforms the
“Fixed UAV location”, “Fixed users’ transmit power”, “No
UAV jamming”, and “Fixed offloading variables” strategies
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Fig. 6. Max-min secrecy capacity as a function of the minimum offloading
requirement Dmin when T = 0.2 s.
by at least 446%.
Fig. 5 plots the max-min secrecy capacity as a function of SI
efficiency γ when T = 0.2 s and Dmin = 60 KB. It shows that
our proposed joint optimization solution outperforms all other
baseline solutions over a wide range of SI efficiencies. More-
over, we find that the max-min secrecy capacity is independent
of γ in “No UAV jamming” scheme due to pjam = 0 W, while
it keeps decreasing with increasing γ for all other strategies.
This is intuitive since a higher γ results in a stronger residual
self-interference power at the legitimate UAV, which further
reduces the max-min secrecy capacity. Particularly, when SI
efficiency γ increases from −120 dB to −100 dB, the max-min
secrecy capacity decreases from 0.982 bps/Hz to 0.485 bps/Hz
for our proposed joint optimization solution.
Fig. 6 plots the max-min secrecy capacity as a function of
the minimum offloading requirement Dmin when T = 0.2 s.
We find that the max-min secrecy capacity is a decreasing
step function in terms of Dmin. Each decreasing step change
corresponds to an increase in the number of associated users.
This is because a low offloading requirement can be easily
satisfied by associating with the user with the highest se-
crecy capacity. Specifically, when the offloading requirement
increases from 10 KB to 50 KB, the max-min secrecy capacity
decreases from 9.1 bps/Hz to approximately 1 bps/Hz for
our proposed joint optimization solution. The figure shows
that when Dmin is less than 20 KB, the fixed offloading
variables approach achieves the same performance as our
proposed joint optimization solution because the same single
user is associated with the UAV. When Dmin is greater than
20 KB, we find that our proposed joint optimization solution
outperforms the other benchmark approaches.
Figs. 7 and 8 demonstrate the impact of estimated locations
of eavesdropping UAVs on the max-min secrecy capacity when
T = 0.2 s and T = 0.16 s, respectively. We note that when
T = 0.2 s, only user 3 must offload some of its large-size
task to the legitimate UAV to satisfy the latency constraint.
It can be seen from Fig. 7 that in order to improve the
secrecy capacity, the legitimate UAV chooses different users
to associate with based on different estimated locations of the
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Fig. 7. The optimal system configuration when T = 0.2 s and Dmin = 60 KB for different estimated locations of eavesdropping UAVs.
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Fig. 8. The optimal system configuration when T = 0.16 s and Dmin = 60 KB for different estimated locations of eavesdropping UAVs.
eavesdropping UAVs. Specifically, when the eavesdropping
UAVs are located as shown in Fig. 7(a), the users 3 and
6 are associated with the legitimate UAV with a max-min
secrecy capacity of 0.930 bps/Hz, whereas only a max-min
secrecy capacity of 0.745 bps/Hz can be achieved when the
eavesdropping UAVs are located as shown in Fig. 7(b) and the
legitimate UAV associates with the users 3 and 8. Moreover,
with a strict latency requirement when T = 0.16 s, the users
1, 3, 5 and 6 must offload some of their large-size tasks due
to the limited local computing resource equipped on them. It
can be seen from Fig. 8 that the max-min secrecy capacity
decreases from 0.384 bps/Hz to 0.347 bps/Hz when the
estimated locations of the eavesdropping UAVs change from
Fig. 8(a) to Fig. 8(b) without affecting the user association
due to the strict latency requirement. This is intuitive since
closer estimated locations of eavesdropping UAVs result in a
reduced secrecy performance.
Figs. 7(a) and 8(a) show the impact of latency on the
max-min secrecy capacity with the same locations of both
the ground users and eavesdropping UAVs. We observe that
when the latency requirement decreases from T = 0.2 s to
T = 0.16 s, the max-min secrecy capacity also decreases
from 0.930 bps/Hz to 0.384 bps/Hz. According to (8), (10)
and (11), we note that the latency affects the objective function
from two aspects. On the one hand, for local computing, when
the latency requirement is very strict, more users with large
packet size cannot meet the latency requirement with local
computing. Thus, more users will offload tasks to the UAV
and the max-min secrecy capacity is low. On the other hand,
for offloading, the offloading ratio η at each associated user
should be small to reduce the transmission and offloading time
and ensure that the strict latency requirement is guaranteed.
This leads to more users associating with the UAV to meet
the minimum offloading requirement and reducing the max-
min secrecy capacity. This phenomenon is verified in Figs. 7(a)
and 8(a) where only user 3 and 6 with η3 = 1 and η6 = 1 are
associated with the legitimate UAV when T = 0.2 s, whereas
the users 1, 3, 5 and 6 are associated with the legitimate UAV
when T = 0.16 s with offloading ratios η1 = 0.96, η3 = 0.72,
η5 = 0.94 and η6 = 1, respectively.
Fig. 9 shows the tradeoff between the max-min secrecy
capacity and the actual system latency as a function of the
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Fig. 9. The tradeoff between the max-min secrecy capacity and actual system
latency as a function of γ when T = 0.2 s and Dmin = 60 KB.
UAV self-interference efficiency γ. We set the γ between
−110 dB to −120 dB. The actual system latency is defined
as the maximum latency over all users, which is Tac =
max
i∈N
max{TLi , (TTri + TOi )}. The plot shows that a higher
max-min secrecy capacity is achievable with longer latency.
Conversely, a lower latency system design can be achieved
by sacrificing the security performance. This is because when
γ is small, the self-interference at the legitimate UAV can
be effectively cancelled and a higher UAV jamming power
is available for the eavesdropping links. To maximize the
minimum secrecy capacity, more UAV power is allocated for
jamming and less power is used for processing the offloaded
packets, which results in an increased system latency. We can
see from Fig. 9 that for PUAVmax = 1 W, the max-min secrecy
capacity increases from 0.935 bps/Hz to 0.977 bps/Hz when
the actual system latency increases from 0.123 s to 0.170 s. We
note that the security-latency feasible region can be increased
by increasing the UAV power since more power is available
for both jamming and offloading.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigated the security performance of a UAV-
enabled MEC system with multiple ground users, one legiti-
mate UAV and multiple eavesdropping UAVs with imperfect
locations. To maximize the minimum secrecy capacity, the
UAV location, users’ transmit power, UAV jamming power,
offloading ratio, UAV computing capacity and offloading user
association are jointly optimized with the latency, total power
and minimum offloading requirements. Moreover, an efficient
algorithm is proposed to solve the optimization problem iter-
atively. Numerical results show that our proposed iterative al-
gorithm outperforms other baseline schemes over a wide range
of SI efficiencies, locations and packet sizes of ground users.
Furthermore, we show that there exists a fundamental trade-
off between the security and latency of UAV-enabled MEC
systems which depends on the full-duplex self-interference
efficiency and total UAV power constraints. To further improve
the security performance, the extension to multiple legitimate
UAVs would be an interesting future research direction which
results in a more-complex optimization problem with multiple
possible UAVs for user offloading.
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